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Abstract 
Nations with a predominantly ethno-cultural self-perception and citizenship based on jus sanguinis 
are under pressure today to adopt more civic-territorial ideas of nationhood, including elements of 
jus soli. Two nations experiencing these trends in Europe but have rarely been juxtaposed are Greece 
and Germany. Characteristic of both nations is a long reserved privileged access to citizenship and 
settlement assistance for co-ethnic immigrants from Eastern Europe and recently the Former Soviet 
Union. This article argues that changes to the way these privileged immigrant groups and their 
settlement are addressed should also reflect changes to the national idiom. The paper contrasts 
Greece to Germany and finds that, similarly to developments in its northern counterpart, Greek 
repatriates  from  the  Former  Soviet  Union  have  been  an  important  consequence  of  the  ethno-
cultural idiom and reinforced it at times. In the new millennium these immigrants’ importance is 
diminishing in reality, if not on paper. The article concludes that in spite of this and the citizenship 
reform of 2010, the tendency to see the country as a culturally homogeneous nation is still fairly 
strong in Greece. The analysis draws on interviews with ‘repatriates’ in both countries and with 
national policy-makers in Greece, as well as on newspaper clippings, opinion polls and statistical 
data, complemented by leading scholarship in the field to date. 
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Introduction 
This  paper  is  part  of  a  doctoral  research  study  which  investigates  in  systematic 
comparative perspective the integration of ethnic Greeks and ethnic Germans from the 
Former  Soviet  Union  (FSU)  in  their  historical  homelands,  Greece  and  Germany,  after 
perestroika
2. The migration and integration of both groups of ‘late re-settlers’ or ‘home-
comers’,  as  they  are  variously  called
3,  exhibits  an  astounding  array  of  similarities. 
Following the collapse of communism, members of both groups, long-standing minorities 
on Russian and later Soviet territory, simultaneously left their places of residence in the 
Soviet Union and later the independent republics of Kazakhstan, Georgia and the Russian 
Federation
4 in order to immigrate to what were commonly referred to by political elites 
and migrants themselves as their ‘mother-countries’ or ancestral homes. As a result, the 
post-Soviet ‘repatriates’
5 were singled out by both the Greek and German government as 
the sole receivers of wide-ranging state assistance measures, unavailable to ‘ordinary’ 
foreign  migrants.
6  Such provisions have made them the most privileged immigrant 
groups in the country. The size of the migration flow was significant in each of the two 
cases, compared to the population size of the prospective receiving societies.  
Despite their favourable treatment, ethnic Greeks and ethnic Germans from the 
FSU have faced very similar integration problems after the ‘return’ to their ‘homelands’. 
These range from more ‘structural’ phenomena, such as language problems, housing in 
less  affluent  areas,  residential  segregation  and  severe  difficulties  entering  the  labour 
market with qualifications acquired in the Soviet Union, to factors of more psychological 
and emotional nature, including mutually felt differences in socialisation, mentality and 
expectations between newcomers and hosts. These have lead to conflicting inter-group 
relations (Hess, 2008: 1532-1535). As a result, integration problems continue into the first 
                                                             
2 Parts of an earlier version of this paper were published in November 2010 by Political Perspectives 4 (2): 
25-48, postgraduate journal in politics of the University of Manchester. I would like to thank two 
anonymous reviewers of the Journal of Comparative Research in Anthropology and Sociology, Dr. A. White 
of the University of Bath, Dr. K.  Kaurinkoski of the French School of Athens and my colleagues C. 
Marazopoulos and W. Shen for their helpful comments. Greek names and titles are transliterated according 
to the UN/ELOT 743 (ISO 843) transliteration scheme. Russian transliteration follows Library of Congress 
guidelines. 
3 From 1993 onwards, the German term used is Spätaussiedler (meaning ‘late re-settlers’). Official parlance 
in Greece uses the term palinnostountes homogeneis, literally meaning ‘people from the same 
genealogical origin who are returning home again’. 
4 For Greeks and Germans combined, these three countries have sent the highest numbers of ‘repatriates’. 
For  Greece,  other  countries  of  origin  include  Ukraine  (3%),  Uzbekistan  (2%)  and    Armenia  (6%)  (M-MT 
census, 2000: 51) and for Germany Kyrgyzstan (4.5%) and the Ukraine (6.7%) (Bundesverwaltungsamt, 2010, 
www.bva.bund.de). See also Migrationsbericht 2008 (Bundesinnenministerium, 2008, www.bmi.bund.de). 
5 I initially use the term in inverted commas to highlight that it is a contested issue whether these 
immigrants are really repatriating after having lived abroad for centuries. In the Greek case, the issue is 
even more complex, as the majority of FSU ‘repatriates’, the Pontian Greeks, have never lived in Greece, 
but in the Pontos in Asia Minor from where many of them emigrated to Russia and the Soviet Union and 
later from there to Greece. Throughout the article, I abstain from using inverted commas for the purpose 
of better readability. 
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decade of the 21
st century, despite some of the post-socialist wave ‘repatriates’ having 
arrived over twenty years ago (see Table 1).
7  
 
Table 1. Number of co-ethnic immigrants from the former Soviet Union in Greece and Germany¹ 
Year  Ethnic Greeks   Ethnic Germans  
1987       169    14.488 
1988       669    47.572 
1989    5.195    98.134 
1990  16.716  147.950 
1991  17.331  147.333 
1992  19.846  195.629 
1993  25.720  207.347 
1994  14.737  213.214 
1995  14.586  209.409 
1996  14.298  172.181 
1997  12.381  131.895 
1998    5.761  101.550 
1999    4.676  103.599 
2000    1.307    94.558 
2001  *     97.434 
2002      90.587 
2003      72.289 
2004      58.728 
2005      35.396 
2006        7.626 
2007        5.695 
2008        4.301 
2009        3.292 
2010        2.297 
Until 03/ 2011           396 
Total                 Estimate: approx. 200.000  2.262.860 
* data for following years unavailable 
 
Sources:  
Figures for Greece: Adapted from: General Secretariat (2000), p. 52. Figures for Germany: Info-Dienst Deutsche 
Aussiedler nos. 91 (1997), 110 (2000), 118 (2005); Migrationsbericht 2004 (figures for 2001, 2002, 2003), various official 
statements and press releases by the Bundesinnenministerium (German Federal Ministry of the Interior) (1998-2000), 
Migrationsbericht 2009 (German Federal Ministry of the Interior), Jahresstatistik 2010 and Monatsstatistik März 2011 by 
the Bundesverwaltungsamt (Federal Office of Administration). 
Greek figures include all those registered in the regional offices of the prefectures at the time of the census 
(nomarchies).  German  figures  include  all  those  registered  at  the  Federal  Office  of  Administration 
(Bundesverwaltungsamt).  These  individuals  either  possess  citizenship  or  are  in  the  process  of  obtaining  it.  The 
verification and acquisition process varies in length between Greece and Germany and sometimes within each country. 
 
                                                             
7 In both cases, ‘return’ migration to the ancestral home has a history that precedes the collapse of 
communism in Eastern Europe. Considering the Cold War period here for purposes of space, there were 
numerous smaller waves of Greek and German returnees, permitted to leave the Soviet Union when Greek-
Soviet or German-Soviet bilateral relations and the global political climate were favourable. One such 
emigration wave occurred for example during political thaws under the rule of Khrushchev, initially in 1957, 
but also later between 1965-67 when approximately 13.500 Greeks were allowed to leave the Soviet Union 
(Karpozilos, 1999: 154).  Journal of Comparative Research in Anthropology and Sociology, Volume 2, Number 1, Spring 2011 
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Despite the richness of overlaps and analogies, ethnic German and ethnic Greek 
‘repatriates’ from the FSU have hitherto only been studied individually, exploring them in 
national contexts alone, predominantly by scholars of their own country. By situating 
them in a comparative framework for the first time, the doctoral research on which this 
paper  is  based  seeks  to  explore  two  so-called  conundrums.  From  the  viewpoint  of 
migrants, it traces why, despite equally being the most privileged immigrant group in 
terms  of  state  support,  significant  barriers  to  integration  continue  to  exist.  Can  a 
comparative  investigation  shed  any  more  light  on  this  question?  The  work  also 
investigates  whether  integration  problems  are  country-specific  or  of  a  more  general 
nature – pinpointing perhaps universal tendencies in ethnic migrations, particularly in the 
context of post-socialist East-West migration in Europe. Such a contribution responds to 
calls in migration research to transcend the singularities of national case studies in order 
to enhance our understanding of what separates general from particular tendencies of 
migrant integration, particularly in the European context. 
This paper looks at a specific aspect of the integration process of repatriates in 
Greece  and  Germany.  It  focuses  on  the  receiving  countries,  their  dominant  ideas  of 
nationhood and their relationship with their diasporas from the FSU. The rationale for 
Greek  and  German  political  elites  in  the  late  1980s  to  allow,  even  champion,  the 
repatriation of co-ethnic minorities from Eastern Europe had manifold reasons. However, 
it is unimaginable without a precedence given to maintaining relations with members of 
common  descent  living  outside  national  borders.  This  is  typical  of  nations  with  a 
predominantly  ethno-cultural  self-perception,  having  institutionalised  the  ‘principle  of 
blood’ (jus sanguinis) for the award of citizenship. Whereas predominantly civic nations 
are built around historic territory, a legal-political community, legal-political equality of its 
members and a common civic culture (Smith, 1991: 11), ethnic nations are more closely 
premised on real or imputed genealogy, actual or presumed descent ties, vernacular 
languages, customs and traditions and the moral and rhetorical potential for popular 
mobilisation (ibid.: 12-13). Ethno-cultural nations typically award citizenship to children 
born to a member of the ethnic community, whereas for civic nations the place of birth 
and  an  allegiance  to  political  values  determines  the  right  to  citizenship  (jus  soli).  In 
Greece  and  Germany,  both  ‘late  nations’,  ethno-cultural  components  have  often,  not 
always,  ‘won’  or  taken  precedence  in  debates  at  important  historical  junctures. 
Consequently, jus sanguinis has had a strong tradition.
8 Historically, the German nation 
was seen as an ‘irreducibly particular Volksgemeinschaft’, an organic cultural, linguistic 
and even racial community (Brubaker, 1992: 1) revolving around the notion of a German 
‘folk’ and its national traditions (Volkstum). Similarly, the Greek nation was constructed 
around ethnic origins, Orthodoxy and the cultural heritage of Hellenism (Venturas, 2009: 
125),  as  well  as  language  (Tsoukala,  1999:  112).  In  both  cases,  ‘Germanisations’  and 
‘Hellenisations’  of  foreign  residents  on  national  territory  and  the  idea  of  ethnic 
homogeneity have played an important part in the history of the nation and its identity.  
For Greece and Germany, their co-ethnic minorities in the Former Soviet Union belong to 
                                                             
8 It is important to note, however, that nations are rarely purely ethnic or civic. Nationhood in Greece and 
Germany has also included civic and territorial elements.     Heß / Ethnic visions of the national self 
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their  ‘imagined  communities’  (Anderson,  1991),  regardless  of  whether  any  factual 
collective experience existed (Voutira, 2004: 533). In fact, in Greece the very existence of 
a varied, diachronic global diaspora has predisposed nationality and citizenship towards a 
jus sanguinis logic (Kaurinkoski, 2010b: 2).  
Sociologists, anthropologists and historians affirm that the axiomatic right of entry 
for repatriates from Eastern Europe after the fall of communism confirmed or at least 
corresponded to the ethno-cultural character of the Greek and German nation (Bade, 
1990;  Brubaker,  1992:  6;  Voutira,  2006:  398,  Kaurinkoski,  2010b:  2).  Other  accounts 
criticise that the special treatment awarded to repatriates has made them the epitome of 
nations defining belonging in terms of descent and cultural affinity and of an inward 
looking and closed model of citizenship (Otto, 1991; Christopoulos and Tsitselikis, 2003).   
If this is true, then even more can be understood in both countries through the 
prism  of  repatriation  from  the  FSU.  If  repatriates  are  a  symptomatic  means  of 
understanding dominant ideas of nationhood, then a changing approach towards them 
might indicate that changes are occurring to the national idiom itself. The way repatriates 
are  being  perceived  and  addressed  may  even  contribute  to  a  modification  of  the 
dominant idea of the national self. It is this relationship and these changes that we aim to 
explore in this article.
9 Why is it an opportune time to undertake such an analysis? In the 
context of European integration and growing immigration, pressures on ethno-culturally 
defined  nations  with  birth -right  membership  to  become  more  inclusive  have  been 
mounting. Whereas Germany introduced new citizenship regulations in 2000, Greece has 
reformed its tradition of jus sanguinis recently, in March 2010. The present citizenship law 
now includes elements of jus soli for the first time in Greek history. Three months ago, a 
department of the Hellenic Council of State appealed against the provisions of this law, 
declaring  it  as  unconstitutional.  This  makes  the  dynamics  in  the  Greek  case  highly 
interesting.  
Since  Greece  and  Germany  have  so  far  rarely  been  situated  in  a  comparative 
framework, possibly because arguments about their different geographical size, cultures 
and economic capacities prevented such endeavours, the article aims to carve out and 
account  for  a  surprising  array  of  similarities.  Although  the  approach  is  clearly 
comparative, the idea is to use the German example as a conceptual vantage point and 
contrast Greece against it. As a consequence, although primary data will inform both 
country analyses, more emphasis will be given to exploring the Greek context, because a 
so themed investigation including primary data is lacking for Greece and because current 
developments  in  Greece  highlight  the  timeliness  and  urgency  of  such  an  analysis  for 
Greece in particular. 
The investigation builds on an idea by the American sociologist Daniel Levy who has 
explored  representations  of  ethnic  German  ‘re-settlers’  and  their  significance  for  the 
German  idea  of  nationhood  (1999,  2002,  2003).  He  maintains  that  the  increasingly 
negative perception of ethnic German repatriates by the public, the gradual dwindling of 
official ethno-cultural rhetoric, increasingly restrictive legislation and the growing focus 
                                                             
9 This is not to suggest, however, that repatriation is the only force impacting on discourses on nationhood 
and citizenship regulations. I do suggest, however, that they are significant. Journal of Comparative Research in Anthropology and Sociology, Volume 2, Number 1, Spring 2011 
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on ethnic Germans’ integration problems lead to a lessening significance of an ethno-
culturally defined idea of nationhood. After a review of these developments in Germany, 
this paper asks to what extent similar processes can be observed for Greece. It draws on 
interviews by the author with repatriates in Greece and Germany and  policy makers at 
federal level in Greece. This is complemented by an analysis of legal texts, newspaper 
articles and opinion polls. For the doctoral research study underpinning this paper, a total 
of 47 semi-structured interviews were conducted so far between 2008-2011, in various 
urban and rural locations in Greece and Germany. All interviews were conducted by the 
author in languages appropriate to context and interviewee. Migrant interviews were 
conducted  in  Russian,  either  in  migrants’  homes  or  at  their  workplaces,  and  lasted 
between  1  and  2.5  hours.  Interviews  with  policy  makers  and  integration  programme 
workers  were  conducted  at  the  relevant  institutions  in  German,  Greek,  English  or 
Russian.
10 Rather than claiming representativeness, this qualitative study chose to trace 
the  interrelation  between  differen t  integration  variables  and  highlight  respondents’ 
subjective and interpretative insights.  
Finally,  it  remains  to  underline  that  ‘nation’  and  ‘national  identity’  are  salient 
concepts in this paper, but also highly contested terms. Here, we accept Anthony Smith’s 
definition of nation as ‘a named human population sharing an historic territory, common 
myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common 
legal rights and duties for all members’ (1991: 14). Comprehending ‘identity’ as a ‘sense of 
self’, national identity can be understood as the psychological bonds of solidarity that 
unite members of the nation (Triandafyllidou, 1998: 595; Smith, 1991: 15), consciously 
creating their ‘sense of belonging’ to a territory that is understood as the native land. 
Where national identity relies heavily on ethnic identity, the two have sometimes been 
used interchangeably. However, this obscures the fact that the question of overlap is 
essentially  one  of  the  definition  of  the  nation.  For  civic  nations,  such  as  the  United 
Kingdom  and  France,  ethnic  and  national  identity  can  be  two  largely  unrelated, 
sometimes overlapping qualities - whereas in Germany and Greece the nation relied/relies 
on ethnic and cultural criteria.
11  Ethnicity, according to Dietz, is built on four markers: the 
conception  of  a  common  ancestry,  a  common  historical background  and  collective 
experiences, a series of shared socio -cultural features, the subjective and conscious 
avowal to the ethnic group (‘self-ascription’) and finally, an external perception of the 
boundaries of the ethnic group (‘ascription’) (2005: 39). Ethnic identity can be claimed by 
individuals  and  groups  and  can  change,  diminish  or  resurge.  In  this  sense,  ‘ethnicity’ 
becomes a resource and a tool that can be used for the mobilisation of different interests 
(Esser, 1988: 235ff.)  
However, national identity (or nationhood, the national self or national idiom, as I 
variously call it in this paper) is a ‘gradually develop(ing), (…) contingent, conjuncturally 
fluctuating, and precarious frame of vision and basis for individual and collective action’ 
(Brubaker,  1994:  9),  rather  than  a  ‘stable  underlying  cause’  (Calhoun,  1989:  59).  This 
                                                             
10 An assistant translator was present during five interviews with Greek policy makers, administrative staff, 
social workers and integration programme coordinators in Athens and Thrace. 
11 Also, ethnic groups can be larger than nations, and can lack what the latter possess: a common territory.     Heß / Ethnic visions of the national self 
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makes national identity and by definition the decision about who belongs to the national 
community and who does not ‘discursively constituted’ (Levy, 2003: 290) rather than 
statically given at any point in time. Thus, the ‘sense of belonging’ itself becomes subject 
to contestation and malleability, for example by those with the power to define it.  
National  identity  and  citizenship  regimes  appear  to  be  situated  in  a  reciprocal 
relationship: nationhood finds expression in citizenship regulations while at the same 
time citizenship regimes consolidate prevailing ideas of the nation. Citizenship is the tool 
of ‘social closure’ (Brubaker, 1992: 23) which decides access to membership in the nation. 
National  approaches  to  citizenship  and  by  extension  to  immigration  thus  become 
powerful indicators of the dominant (but changing and changeable) idea of nationhood. 
When members of common descent ‘repatriate’ to the ‘motherland’, their insertion in 
society and the approach of the state towards them are a useful prism through which we 
may access valuable clues about the nation’s self-understanding. Brubaker has described 
such movements as migrations of ‘ethnic unmixing’ (1998: 1049). They are flows where 
ethnic affinity and its purposeful activation play a key role in motivating and structuring 
the movement. 
Repatriation and national identity in Germany 
Levy  identifies  three  important  phases  in  the  re-making  of  Germany’s  ethno-cultural 
idiom  in  the  20
th  century  which  rely  on  a  more  or  less  direct  relationship  between 
national  self-understanding  and  the  ‘repatriation’  of  ethnic  Germans  from  Eastern 
Europe. They include the immediate post-war decade, the 1960s and 1970s and finally the 
post-Cold War period (2003: 292-297). These junctures are instructive to look at briefly as 
they inform our subsequent discussion of developments in Greece. 
Following  the  end  of  the  fascist  dictatorship  in  1945,  national  identity  in  West 
Germany was rebuilt with reference to a narrative of collective victimhood. Victimisation 
was legitimised by the German diaspora from Eastern Europe: destitute masses of ethnic 
German  refugees  and  expellees  pouring  in  during  the  last  years  of  the  war  and  its 
aftermath.  They  had  been  victims  of  persecution,  expulsion,  ethnic  cleansing  and 
atrocities  committed  by  the  Red  Army  (Schulze,  2006:  370).  As  returning  diaspora 
members to an ethnic nation they had multiple functions in post-war (West) Germany. 
They were employed by political elites as pawns in cold war politics, used as a symbol of 
the  free  and  superior  West,  juxtaposed  to  communism  and  the  atrocities  and 
suppression it was associated with. German Chancellor Adenauer also understood their 
importance in helping him to sustain the claim that his republic was the only legitimate 
successor  to  the  German  Reich  and  solely  embodied  German  unity.  Refugees  and 
expellees from Eastern Europe themselves lent impetus to this discourse. Throughout 
the 1950s, they played an active part in West German politics, formed their own party and 
had a strong lobby in parliament. It was their importance as national (and strategic) 
symbols  and  their  visibility  which  influenced  legislators  to  interpret  the  German 
citizenship  law  of  1913  in  generous  terms,  giving  full  legal  equality to  ethnic  German 
immigrants and to those still remaining in Eastern Europe (as members of the ‘imagined 
community’).  Despite  designated  state  assistance  programmes,  social  marginalisation Journal of Comparative Research in Anthropology and Sociology, Volume 2, Number 1, Spring 2011 
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continued  throughout  the  1950s  (Schulze,  2006:  371).  Although  at  the  end  of  this 
juncture, the ethno-cultural idea of the German nation was reinforced, scholars disagree 
what caused this. Some argue that the privileged treatment of ethnic German repatriates 
was a reflection of the ethnic tradition leading to a further entrenchment of the ethno-
cultural  idiom  (Bade,  1992;  Brubaker,  1992:  6).  Others  emphasise  that  pragmatic 
considerations over political legitimacy against the backdrop of a divided Germany and 
concerns  over  the  integration  of  repatriates  have  been  elementary  (Levy,  2002:  223; 
2003: 293). Evidence remains for the contingency of national identity and the utilisation 
of  key  agents  and  their  activities  to  certain  ends  in  constructing  national  identity 
discourse. 
In the Soviet zone and the GDR, the relationship between the state and the ‘re-
settlers’ (Umsiedler) was complex. Proportionally, East Germany had to integrate more 
expellees  than  the  West  –  its  population  increased  by  almost  one  fourth  (Reichling, 
1995). Whereas expellees in the East also benefited from state integration policy, their 
self-expression and political representation was suppressed. Schwartz argues that the 
GDR was not equipped or willing to deal with the emotional and cultural consequences 
of  expulsion  (2000:  158).  Politically,  the  conundrum  was  arguably  greater.  The  GDR 
bordered the areas where expellees had been forced out. Initially lacking legitimacy as a 
state, it was seeking to find its identity as the new Eastern Germany. Therefore, political 
elites  needed  to  eliminate  any  hopes  the  expellees  might  have  had  of  return  and 
suppress any of their ‘nationalist’ aspirations (Ther, 2002: 56). The creation of a new 
‘socialist nation’ and a specific GDR citizenship did not allow for a confrontation with 
their memories (Schulze, 2006: 370), until the end of the East German state in 1989. 
In West Germany, the German ethno-cultural idiom started to lose significance with 
Chancellor  Brandt’s  Ostpolitik.  Rapprochement  towards  Eastern  Europe  was  publicly 
condemned by the expellees, making them appear conservative and out of tune with the 
climate of the time but also fuelled negative public perceptions of them (Levy, 2003: 
293). A series of student and civil rights movements in the late 1960s, also known as the 
‘68er’, lead further impetus to this. The protests condemned the infiltration of German 
society with remnants of the Nazi past, associated with a grotesque escalation of the 
ethnic  view  of  the  nation.  These  events  and  perceptions  further  encouraged  a 
renunciation  of  an  ethno-cultural  view  of  the  nation  and  one  of  its  prominent 
embodiments,  the  expellees  and  their  organisations.  In  public  perceptions,  the 
‘datedness’ of expellees’ claims intensified and was labelled, together with the ethno-
nation, as inappropriate for a new time. 
After a brief period characterised by a heightened sense of national particularism, 
typical of the early years after the breakdown of the bipolar order, the German tradition 
to  see  the  nation  as  an  organic  community  bound  by  descent  and  culture  further 
weakened. Throughout the 1990s, co-ethnic returnees from Eastern Europe and their 
ethnic  unmixing  again  influenced  this  process.  Often  relatives  of  those  who  had 
‘returned’  in  earlier  waves  immigrated  to  Germany  based  on  their  ethnic  affinity. 
Throughout the Cold War and up until the end of 1992, immigration of co-ethnics from 
the former Soviet Union was part of a broader process of co-ethnic immigration from     Heß / Ethnic visions of the national self 
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socialist countries in Eastern Europe. Poland, Romania and the (former) Soviet Union 
represented the most important sending countries. During the Cold War, most Germans 
immigrated from Poland and Romania, from where emigration was comparatively easier 
than from the USSR. In 1990, in the year following the collapse of socialist systems in 
Eastern Europe, for the first time Germans were coming in almost equal numbers from 
Poland, Romania and the USSR, totalling almost 400.000 immigrants (Migrationsbericht 
2009: 54).
12 The conservative government in power made appeals to welcome the co -
ethnic  brethren  ‘with  open  arms’,  arguably  also  motivated  by  their  attractiveness  as 
potential  voters.
13  However,  the  government  also  understood  that  against  the 
background  of  a  weakened   ethno-cultural  vision  it  needed  to  complement  its 
‘ideological’ rhetoric with an emphasis on the benefits the repatriates would bring to 
German  society  (Levy,  2003:  294).  Notwithstanding  and  despite  opposition  from  the 
social  democratic  party  (SPD),  the  view  propounded  by  the  ruling  party  appeared 
indisputable: repatriates from the East were Germans towards which the state had a 
constitutional  duty  of  care.  Thus,  initially,  the  ‘resettlers’  continued  to  be  readily 
incorporated into the national community, by acquiring German citizenship easily and 
being recipients of extensive state assistance measures. 
Eventually, however, the ‘utilitarian’ rhetoric that was used to rally support for the 
returnees’ economic contribution to Germany backfired (ibid.). Against the background 
of  high  unemployment,  mass  immigration,  a  public  budget  crisis  and  problems  with 
available housing, Germans showed little solidarity with their ‘brothers from the east’. A 
survey by the Osteuropa-Institut in Munich yields the following results as early as 1990. 
When German immigrants from the Soviet Union were asked whether they felt that they 
were welcome in Germany, only 7% answered ‘yes’, whereas the majority said they were 
partly welcome and over one third clearly felt unwelcome (cf. Dietz, 1995: 170). Over 46% 
perceived that they had experienced some form of discrimination on the basis of their 
origin, most commonly from neighbours or in the workplace (ibid.: 168-169). 
Locals  fused  their  ideas  about  repatriates  with  the  image  they  had  of  ordinary 
foreign  migrants  and  increasingly  thought  of  the  former  as  another  category  of 
immigrants. Particularly from 1993/4 onwards, when the composition of the immigration 
stream changed to increasingly include non-German family members, the newcomers’ 
‘self-ascription’ (Barth)
14 appeared Russian, not German – and their ‘ascription’ by the 
local Germans followed suit. As a result, repatriates were more readily seen simply as 
Russians  than  as  fellow  Germans  (Allensbacher  Jahrbuch  der  Demoskopie,  1993-1997; 
                                                             
12 This year also represents the peak year for the total immigration of Germans from Romania. Between 
1950 and 1997, a total of 430.000 Romanian Germans migrated to Germany. As for those who remain in 
Romania, the last official census in 1992 counted 119.646 individuals of German descent, consisting of two 
main groups: the ‘Siebenbürger Sachsen’ (settled in the central Romanian highlands) and the ‘Banater 
Schwaben’ (settled in West Romania). Today, it is estimated that around 100.00 Germans remain in 
Romania because of family ties (cf. Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, ‘Aussiedlermigration in 
Deutschland’, 2005).  
13 See for example: Der Spiegel, 8/1989, 'Reden nix deutsch-kriegen aber alles.' 
14 Cf. Barth, F. 1969. Ethnic Groups and Boundaries.  Journal of Comparative Research in Anthropology and Sociology, Volume 2, Number 1, Spring 2011 
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author’s fieldwork). More than the functional approach of the government, however, 
migrants’ visible otherness and public use of Russian contributed to this.
15  
To  this  day,  it  is  not  uncommon  to  hear  the  derogative  term  ‘Russian  blocks’ 
(Russenblöcke) for the blocks of flats where ethnic Germans live densely together,  some 
of which are provided by the state as social housing flats.
16 In Oldenburg/Holstein, a small 
town in the German federal state of Schleswig -Holstein, ethnic Germans concentrate in 
one particular street, the Ostlandstraße. Sharp-tongued locals have unofficially re-labelled 
this street as ‘Stalinallee’ (Stalin Boulevard).
17 However, especially throughout the 1990s, 
also areas where ethnic German immigrants built their own houses were stereotyped as 
‘Little Kazakhstan’. Similar labelling processes occurred in Greece at the same time and 
will be touched upon later. 
Those  who  had  been  socialised  under  the  Soviet  system  differed  from  local 
Germans in terms of behaviour, appearance and mentality. Social tensions grew between 
hosts and repatriates not uncommonly involving feelings of envy and suspicion on part of 
the  native  population  for  what  was  regarded  as  undeserved  entitlement  to 
‘compensatory’  state  support.  A  key  explanatory  variable  was  a  lack  of  information 
about the newcomers. A survey conducted for the Ministry of Labour, Health and Social 
Welfare analysing how much native Germans knew about the new arrivals demonstrated 
that  the  latter  lacked  an  in-depth  knowledge  of  the  history  of  German  minorities  in 
Europe (Becker, 1988: 28,35,41). This was part of the reason why native Germans failed to 
muster  the  ethno-cultural  solidarity  policy-makers  had  hoped  for.  However,  Germans 
immigrants  from  the  former  Soviet  Union,  just  as  their  Greek  counterparts,  also 
harboured at best a vague idea of the country they aimed for, prior to immigration. 
“I remember my grandmother speaking of ‘Germany’ – she always said it in a slightly 
toneless, respectful voice [imitates it]. She always had tears in her eyes when she 
spoke of Swabia, the region where she was born. I do not exactly know what I 
thought of Germany. I do not think I had an idea. My aunt who went to Germany in 
1987 told me that everything was so tidy, the streets, the houses, and that there was 
order (‘Ordnung’). She told me that there were cute-looking houses, and everyone 
had a little garden. I wanted to see this.”
18  
Necessarily, migrants in Germany, as in Greece, found reality very different and not 
uncommonly disappointing. One female interviewee told me:  
                                                             
15 Ethnographic fieldwork in central and northern Germany (involving rural and urban locations in the 
former GDR and West Germany), between 2008-2009. 
16 A case in point is the ‘Rieth’ area in Erfurt, observed by the author between 2007 and 2011. There is a 
larger share of social housing available in this area, dominated by blocks of flats built during the 1970s in 
the GDR. Flats offered as social housing are often spatially concentrated. This and the wish of many 
Germans from the FSU to live together are two factors explaining their high spatial concentration. 
17 Author’s fieldwork in Schleswig-Holstein, July-August 2008. 
18 Author’s interview, Oldenburg, Holstein, 16 August 2008.     Heß / Ethnic visions of the national self 
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“I can see now that before I left our village [in Kyrgyzstan  – author’s remark], I 
idealised Germany, because things were getting more and more difficult  around us 
day by day. Of course you build yourself a world.”
19  
Another  woman  admitted  in  the  press:  ‘I  saw  Germany  through  rose-coloured 
glasses’.
20  Quickly,  the  newcomers  learned  and  learned  to  resent  being  called  and 
treated as ‘Russians’. 
“The Germans, they quickly has us pegged as Russians. There (meaning  the village 
where the respondent had lived with his parents in Siberia), we were the Germans, 
or worse, the fascists. They called us the Fritz-s (nas nazyvali fritsy)
21. In the village 
where I lived they said: Ah, there comes the Fritz. And here in Germany, we are the 
Russians.”
22  
In order to alleviate existing and pre-empt further social tensions, but also as a 
result of the budget crisis in the early 1990s and to gain control of what soon appeared 
an uncontrollable extent of co-ethnic immigration from Eastern Europe, a number of 
changes were introduced from 1992. Not only did they mark a contrast to what had just 
recently  appeared  as  unconditionally  ‘open  arms’,  they  also  significantly  altered  the 
immigration  process  from  ex-socialist  Eastern  Europe.  A  new  law  passed  in  1992, 
‘regulating  the  consequences  of  the  Second  World  War’ 
(Kriegsfolgenbereinigungsgesetz/KfBG), stipulated that from 1
st January 1993 applicants 
from Poland and Romania had to convince German authorities that as a result of the 
Second  World  War,  they  were  still  subject  to  discrimination  and  expulsion  pressure 
(Vertreibungsdruck) in their countries of residence on the basis of their German descent. 
Whereas  the  continued  existence  of  such  a  pressure  was  globally  assumed  for  the 
successor  states  of  the  Soviet  Union
23  (where amongst other things ethnic conflicts 
prevailed at the time), it was harder to prove its existence (and urgency) in Poland and 
Romania. Therefore, with the coming into force of the KfBG, immigration from the latter 
two  countries  was  effectively  stopped.  To  corroborate  this  effect,  whereas  in  1990 
133.872 Germans repatriated from Poland and 111.150 from Romania, in 2009 only 45 and 
23 immigrated respectively (Migrationsbericht 2009: 55). 
Also,  legislation  regarding  repatriates  became  increasingly  restrictive.
24  Whereas 
during the Cold War, repatriates received ‘re-settler’ status on presenting their papers at 
the  German  border,  the  German  identity  of  applicants  and    commitment  to  German 
national traditions were now more concretely scrutinised. The commitment to financial 
                                                             
19 Author’s interview Erfurt, 3 August 2008. 
20 Cf. Der Spiegel 1/2008: ‘Im Osten schimmert die Hoffnung’ (p. 38). 
21 Fritz is an older German men’s name which was still widespread at the time of the war. It is the short 
form for Friedrich.  
22 Author’s interview, Lübeck, 26 August 2008. 
23 The argument is compounded by the fact that to this day the Germans of the Soviet Union have not been 
fully rehabilitated. See also Bergner, 2008: 2. 
24 The government announced for example that there will be no separate housing programme for post-
1989 co-ethnic immigrants from Eastern Europe. Journal of Comparative Research in Anthropology and Sociology, Volume 2, Number 1, Spring 2011 
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support  measures  was  reduced  and  in  1996  language  tests  were  introduced  in  the 
successor states of the former Soviet Union to permit only those with a basic command 
of  German  to  immigrate  (Klekowski  von  Kloppenfels,  2002:  113-116).
25  Restrictive 
legislation was publicised, further challenging the idea that repatriates played a specific 
role for the German nation. When repatriates appeared in public discourse, it was more 
in the general context of immigration, rather than in ethno -cultural or privileged terms 
(Levy, 2003: 295).  
To verify this point, I conducted a analysis of articles related to German immigrants 
from Eastern Europe between 1989 and 2011 in the popular news magazine Der Spiegel. It 
yielded  the  following  results.    Initially,  besides  providing  first  information  about  the 
newcomers
26, rocketing mass immigration, not just of co -ethnics from Eastern Europe 
but also from the former GDR and of asylum seekers, lead to debates about how the 
‘social system of Germany’ could cope.
27 At the same time, tendencies of segregation, a 
different mentality and visibly different values especially among the strongly religious 
Mennonite  and  Pentecostal  German  immigrant  communities  were  discussed.
28  From 
1992/3, the extent of immigration continued to be debated a lso in the context of 
Germans  remaining  in  the  FSU,  including  the  (slim)  chances  for  their  territorial 
autonomy.
29  Continuously  high  numbers  of  immigrants  split  traditionalists  (typically 
conservative forces) and reformers (more often the social democratic  party) about the 
accuracy of such a generous welcoming (‘immigration without taboos’) and the need for 
a  citizenship  reform  to  move  away  from  an  exclusive  jus  sanguinis  (which  eventually 
followed in 2000).
30 Ethnic Germans continued to be discussed in the context of general 
migration,  integration  and,  increasingly,  parallel  communities.  They  were    often 
contrasted to asylum seekers. 
Latest in the mid-1990s, the main focus shifted to repatriates’ integration problems, 
confirming  Levy’s  argument.  ‘Die  gespaltene  Stadt’  for  example  picks  up  on  ghetto 
formation,  returnees’  social  isolation,  communities  where  native  Germans  are 
marginalised  and  notes  the  break  in  migrant  profiles.
31  When pre-migration language 
tests were introduced, subliminally, the ambiguity of o fficial policy was pinpointed. 
Finally, from the late 1990s until today, the focus clearly rested on what continue to be 
the most visible signs of non -integration: a widespread lack of language skills among 
‘repatriates’,  their  segregation  and  sustenance  of  parallel  societies  or  ‘societies  with 
society’
32, ongoing social tensions between locals and immigrants. Above all, there was 
                                                             
25 In earlier decades, a lack of German language skills had been seen as a confirmation that the repatriate in 
question had been subject to assimilation pressure in the Soviet Union, and had ultimately confirmed 
his/her status as a repatriate German. All these new measures directly reduced the number of 
naturalisations. 
26 Der Spiegel, 37/1989, ‘Verlorenes Paradies an der Wolga’. 
27 Der Spiegel, 3/1990, ‘Schwebendes Volkstum’. 
28 Der Spiegel, 18/1990, ‘Unzüchtige Welt’; Der Spiegel 12/1990, ‘Hier redet man Russisch’. 
29 Der Spiegel, 42/1992, ‘Nur ein Spalt’; Der Spiegel, 42/1992, ‘Der Traum ist aus’. 
30 Der Spiegel, 11/1993, ‘Ein einig Volk von Blutsbrüdern’; Der Spiegel 14/1993, ‘Die Fahne des Blutes’. 
31 Der Spiegel, 10/1996. 
32 Der Spiegel, 06/1999, ‘Alles ist besser als Kasachstan’.     Heß / Ethnic visions of the national self 
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continued concern about social isolation and severe criminality especially among young 
males who do not want to speak German and prefer the in-group.
33   
Interestingly, some of the most recent articles pinpoint two telling developments in 
the integration of co-ethnics and their families from the former Soviet Union. On the one 
hand, a number of politicians of the Christian Democratic   Party (CDU) endorse the 
facilitation  of    immigration  restrictions  for  co -ethnics  again,  especially  for  family 
members, by favouring an abolition of the language tests introduced in 1996. This is 
hoped to provide much needed new voters
34, but also exhibits the functionality of policy 
interests.
35 Moreover, the increasing desire of some ‘returnees’ to ‘inverse-return’ back 
to their areas of previous residence, mostly Russia and Kazakhstan, is discussed, also as a 
sign of what is perceived as a ‘partly unsuccessful repatriation policy’.
36 As time went on, 
the frequency of articles relating to co-ethnic immigrants decreased. 
As  repatriates  moved  from  a  ‘national  symbol’  to  a  ‘social  subject’,  the  ethno-
culturally defined idea of nationhood in Germany was further weakened (ibid.). It was 
not long before Germany overhauled its long standing tradition of jus sanguinis in 2000 to 
add elements of jus soli, easing the naturalisation of foreigners. It also became more 
tolerant towards dual citizenship (without championing it)
37. This was the first major 
citizenship  reform  since  1913  and  represented  a  marked  break  with  Germany’s 
longstanding  tradition  of  defining  belonging  to  the  national  community  in  terms  of 
genealogy. The greater inclusiveness it allowed for showed clear signs that Germany was 
coming to terms with the reality of having become an immigration country. Embracing 
Germany’s  multicultural  diversity  also  reverberated  into  wider  society,  indicating  that 
important reference points of national identity discourse had changed. This does not 
mean  that  repatriates  from  the  FSU  were  the  only  factor  generating  these  changes, 
however, they played a key part. While an already weakened ethno-cultural idiom at the 
beginning  of  the  1990s  initially  necessitated  the  additional  employment  of  functional 
rhetoric  about  the  economic  benefits  of  repatriation,  eventually  the  lessening 
significance  of  repatriates  and  the  increasing  focus  on  their  integration  problems 
contributed to a rethinking of some of the fundamentals which had defined belonging 
and regulated membership in the nation for all of the twentieth century.  
However,  while  Germany  has  clearly  recognised  its  status  as  an  immigration 
country  and  embraces  a  more  political  concept  of  the  nation,  the  future  of 
multiculturalism in the country is still uncertain. At the time of going to press, the weak 
                                                             
33 Der Spiegel, 3 June 2004, ‘Die verlorenen Schafe von Marzahn’; Der Spiegel, 1 April 2005, ‘Die Russen von 
Cloppenburg’. 
34  Der Spiegel, 3/2006, ‘Runter von der Bremse’. 
35  Ibid. 
36 Der Spiegel, 1/2008, ‘Im Osten schimmert die Hoffnung’. 
37 The new German Nationality Act (Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht, StAG) was passed in the lower house of 
parliament on 19 March 1999 and came into force on 01
st January 2000. It was followed by the Immigration 
Act of 2004 (see Hailbronner, 2006: 213-251). Journal of Comparative Research in Anthropology and Sociology, Volume 2, Number 1, Spring 2011 
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integration especially of Turkish and Arab immigrants in Germany gives new impetus to 
an ongoing immigration and integration debate.
38 
Repatriation and national identity in Greece 
Not only was the Greek nation built on similar ethno-cultural premises to the German 
nation, historically it made a crucial distinction not just between citizens and non-citizens, 
but also between those of common Greek Orthodox descent (ομογενείς/ homogeneis) 
and of other descent (αλλογενείς/ allogeneis). Both terms originate from the term genos 
(race, phyle). This resonates with the distinction between those who are indigenous to a 
territory  (autochthons)  and  those  considered  foreign,  possibly    even  a  threat  to  it 
(allocthons). Characteristically, the Greek term for nationality is ithageneia
39, indicating 
the importance of co-ethnic descent in the Greek definition of nationality. 
Throughout  the  20
th  century,  both  Greece  and  Germany  experienced  similarly 
strong influxes of co-ethnic refugees. Although they occurred at different times, they 
were both a consequence of the ethno-cultural idea of nationhood and reinforced it in 
turn.  As a result of persecution and the 1922/23 forced population exchange between 
Greece and Turkey an estimated 1.2 million Greeks from Asia Minor and the Pontos
40 fled 
to Greece (Hirschon, 2003: 14). This is comparable to the mass migration of Germans 
from Eastern Europe to Germany between 1944 -1947 – not in absolute numbers, but in 
the impact these co-ethnic immigrations had on the receiving societies. With the mass 
entry of ethnic Greeks in 1922 and 1923, Greece achieved large scale ethnic homogeneity 
(Pentzopoulos,  1962:  126)  –  which  reinforced  an  important  pillar  of  Greek  national 
identity, the idea of a nation made up of ethnic Greeks of Orthodox faith. 
Similarly  to  Germany  in  the  1960s  and  1970s,  after  the  end  of  the  military 
dictatorship in Greece in 1974, the country experienced a public backlash reaction against 
nationalist rhetoric. Its intensity, however, could not be compared to similar reactions in 
Germany. Nazism had not developed and spread from Greece, but from Germany, with 
all  known  repercussions  for  European  history.  I  suggest  therefore  that  although  a 
distancing from ethno-cultural rhetoric might have occurred in Greece temporarily, the 
absence of fascist dictatorship meant that there was a less complicated confrontation 
with  the  ethno-cultural  idea  of  the  nation.  I  thus  tentatively  suggest  that  the  ethno-
cultural narrative of nationhood experienced less of a rupture. In fact, starting from the 
1980s,  the  social  democratic  party  (PASOK)  developed  an  active  interest  in  emigrant 
Greeks and encouraged their repatriation to Greece.
41 The government, however,  was 
mostly interested in the Greek diaspora in Western Europe (and to some extent Northern 
                                                             
38 See also the debate kick-started by the social democratic politician Thilo Sarrazin on the failing 
integration and ‘integrate-ability’ of Muslims in Germany and German Chancellor Merkels’ recognition that 
immigrants need to do more to integrate, especially learn German, and that therefore, multiculturalism had 
failed (see speech at the ‘Deutschlandtag der Jungen Union’).  
39 Emphasis added in bold to highlight semantic derivation. 
40 The ‘Pontos’ is a historical region which comprises the southern shores of the Black Sea. 
41 The ‘General Secretariat for Greeks Abroad’ was established in 1982 in order to coordinate measures and 
achieve greater coherence in addressing diaspora Greeks.      Heß / Ethnic visions of the national self 
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America) (Venturas, 2009: 127-128). At the same time, there was noticeable silence, even 
neglect, towards the Greeks in the Soviet Union. Part of this was attributable to the 
sensitive relationship between the Soviet Union and Western European states during the 
Cold War (Notaras, 2001: 231). However, in 1986, deputy foreign minister Giannis Kapsis 
appealed to the Soviet ambassador in Athens to re-open talks about the Greeks in the 
Soviet Union (ibid.). In the same decade a housing programme for Soviet Greeks was 
initiated,  aiming  to  settle  Soviet  repatriates  in  northern  Greece,  in  the  regions  of 
Macedonia and Thrace (Notaras, 2009).
42 Just to contrast, in Germany, it wa s decided 
that no such preferential housing programme would be devised. This, however, needs to 
be  seen  against  a  stronger  welfare  state  which  was  nevertheless  able  to  include 
newcomers in its basic social security provisions. Social housing, for example, exists only 
to a very limited in Greece on the whole.  
 
Table 2. Immigrant population in Greece, 1991 and 2001. 
Population  1991  2001 
Total population  10.260.000  10.964.020 
Documented Foreigners in Greece 
(and in %) 
     167.000 (2%)       797.091 (7%) 
Source: National Statistical Service of Greece, 2001, also cited in Triandafyllidou and Gropas, 2005: 5. 
 
Table 3. Nationalities of the main immigrant groups in Greece.  
Breakdown of foreign and foreign-born population 
in Greece by main nationality group in 2001 
In numbers 
Total number of documented foreigners  797.091 
Of which approximately:   
Albanians  438.000 
Pontian Greeks (from the FSU)  155.000-200.000* 
Nationals from (then) EU-15    47.000 
Bulgarians    35.000 
Georgians    20.000 
Romanians    20.000 
Russians    17.500 
Cypriots    17.000 
Poles    13.000 
Pakistanis    10.000 
Ukrainians    10.000 
Indians    10.000 
Undocumented immigrants  200.000 
Sources: National Statistical Service of Greece, 2001; General Secretariat for Repatriating Greeks, 2000: 
Estimates by Triandafyllidou and Gropas, 2005: 7. * Kaurinkoski estimates the figure to be closer to 200.000 
(2010a,b). 
 
Just as for Germany, 1989 presented the decisive turning point also for Greece, not 
merely in terms of Soviet (and later post-Soviet) repatriation, but in generating a series 
                                                             
42 Author’s interview with Director of Housing Programme, Gerassimos Notaras, Agricultural Bank of 
Greece, Athens, 23 June 2009. Journal of Comparative Research in Anthropology and Sociology, Volume 2, Number 1, Spring 2011 
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of changes which would eventually lead to the overhaul of both countries’ citizenship 
laws  towards  a  more  inclusive  model.  Greece  and  Germany  experienced  mass 
immigration (see Tables 2 and 3), of which repatriates from the FSU were not the only 
but a central part. Repatriates played an instrumental role in bringing about Greece’s 
‘turnaround’ (King and Black, 1997) to an immigration country (Lazaridis, 1996). 
Like in Germany, the early 1990s were a period of heightened national feelings in 
Greece, exemplified by the heated debate over the Macedonian question (Triandafyllidou 
et al., 1997). Diamanti-Karanou (2003: 29) maintains that during these years ‘there was a 
general  wish  among  the  Greek  population  and  several  Greek  politicians  to  ‘free’  all 
Greeks living under totalitarian regimes and bring them to Greece’.  This paralleled, if 
perhaps  not  as  publicly  and  explicitly,  the  national  duty  political  elites  in  Germany 
expressed towards their repatriates from Eastern Europe. It ties in with accounts we 
have  of  politicians,  such  as  Giorgos  Papandreou,  attending    the  ‘Conference  of  the 
Greeks  of  the  former  Soviet  Union’  where  the  return  of  Soviet  Greeks  was  actively 
encouraged  and  promises  were  made  by  members  of  governmental  and  non-
governmental  organisations  about    housing  and  other  settlement  assistance  (ibid.). 
According to the Greek newspaper Ta Nea, the Foreign Ministry also issued invitations (Ta 
Nea, 4 October 2003). This stands in curious contrast to the fact - which scholars and 
even policy-makers agree on - that Greece appeared unprepared for the arrival of ethnic 
Greeks of the Soviet Union (Kokkinos, 1991a,b; Voutira, 2003: 149). One hypothesis able 
to shed more light on such a seeming paradox is that in Greece the distance between 
official rhetoric and actual policies is a more common and informally ‘accepted’ part of 
the societal consensus  than in Germany.
43 Be that as it may, in the early years, just as in 
Germany, the view that the Soviet repatriates belonged to the   national  ‘core’  was 
undisputed  (Voutira,  2004:  535)  and  naturalisation  was  simple:  the  presentation  of  a 
Greek repatriation visa acquired at the Greek embassy in Moscow was sufficient. Ethnic 
Greeks were naturalised en masse (Fakiolas, 2001; Christopoulos, 2009: 118-121; see Tables 
4  and  5).  The  acquisition  of  citizenship  by  way  of  presenting  a  repatriation  visa 
constituted  one  characteristic  of  the  privileged  treatment  the  repatriates  received  – 
exemplary for Greece which did not award similar treatment to any other immigrant 
group, be it of shared genealogy (homogeneis) or foreign descent (allogeneis). 
However,  similarly  to  Germany,  the  Greek  state  employed  utilitarian  rhetoric 
towards the settlement of repatriates from the FSU. To some, functional interests were 
the  only  motive  in  encouraging  the  immigration  of  ethnic  Greeks  from  the  ex-USSR 
(Venturas, 2009: 135).
44 In an attempt to recreate the ‘success’ of the settlement of Asia 
Minor Greeks in Macedonia and Thrace after the population exchange of 1922/23, Soviet 
Greeks  were  to  be  settled  in  these  still  underdeveloped  regions  –  to  revitalise  and 
‘hellenise’ them, just as had been expected of those who came at the beginning of the 
century. The National Foundation for the Resettlement of Repatriate Greeks (EIYAPOE) 
                                                             
43 This also implies that the newcomers from the former Soviet Union who were used to a different type of 
state system might not have been familiar with this. 
44 Koliopoulos and Veremis highlight that at the beginning of the 1990s, Greece experienced very low birth 
rates which impacted on its decision to welcome repatriates from the FSU (2007: 225).     Heß / Ethnic visions of the national self 
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publicly stated that ‘the repatriate are people with low economic claims and demands, 
and therefore they can accept without any kind of complaint even the most difficult form 
of life in the border regions’ (1992: 8). It was hoped that ‘their presence in these regions 
will be able to create (…) an economic revitalisation and this will generate the ‘pull’ for a 
return  migration  among  the  local  population  that  had  emigrated’  (ibid.:  6;  cited  by 
Voutira, 2003: 150).
45 Voutira (ibid.: 151) observes that from 1992, the Soviet Greeks were 
represented in the media and public discourse as a key political asset able to solve ‘our 
national development issue in Thrace’.
46 Moreover, Kaurinkoski reminds us that Soviet 
Greeks count as an important electoral force in Greece and ‘return visas’ and indeed 
Greek citizenship was awarded to a number of repatriates to this end, regardless of their 
origin (2008; 2010b: 6). 
 
Table 4. Total number of naturalisations of repatriates   
from the Former Soviet Union in Greece, 1989 – 1999. 
 Attica  34.335 
East Macedonia and Thrace  32.242 
Central Macedonia  49.905 
Western Macedonia    1.665 
Thessaly    1.535 
Epirus       228 
Ionian Islands         34 
Western Greece       124 
Peloponnese       550 
Central Greece       741 
Northern Aegean         91 
Southern Aegean       150 
Crete    3.143 
Source: Christopoulos, 2009: 120, based on research at the Ministry of the Interior. 
 
Officially, the initial post-1989 mass immigration and naturalisation of repatriates in 
Greece  and  in  Germany  confirmed  the  ethno-cultural  ideas  of  Greek  and  German 
nationhood,  although  not  merely  purely  ‘ideological’  (ethnic)  considerations  but  also 
pragmatically defined national interests, such as the attractiveness of the newcomers as 
voters, influenced the official approach (in this case, pragmatically complementing it). 
The latter gained in strength as mass immigration went on, for various reasons which 
differed in Greece and Germany. The result, however, was largely the same. It jointly 
included  a) a decrease in specially granted privileges, b) the growing situation of post-
Soviet co-ethnic immigrants and their families within wider debates about immigration 
and c) ongoing integration problems and the public perception of repatriates as ‘just 
another immigrant group’.    
1994  is  commonly  seen  as  a  turning  point  in  Greek  policy  towards  co-ethnic 
‘returnees’ from the FSU (Voutira, 2003: 152; 2004: 536; Venturas, 2009: 130ff). Analogous 
                                                             
45 In later publications, such assumptions are visibly absent (cf. EIYAPOE and EIYAAPOE – Ekthesi 
Pepragmenon 1991-1995 and 1991-2001). 
46 See for example Ta Nea, 6 June 1993; Thessaloniki, 8 July 1994. Journal of Comparative Research in Anthropology and Sociology, Volume 2, Number 1, Spring 2011 
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responses  to  German  state  policy  can  be  observed.  From  1992/1993  and  1994/1995 
respectively,  both  countries  aimed  to  contain,  regulate  and  control  the  inflow  of 
repatriates. Whereas in Germany, the main rationale was to gain control of incoming 
numbers  and  to  create  better  capacities  for  repatriates’  social  integration,  Greece’s 
motivation  was  more  complex.  There  were  foreign  as  well  as  domestic  policy 
considerations.  
From  1994  onwards,  Greece  considered  it  more  important  if  its  diasporas, 
particularly in the Balkans and the Caucasus, remained in their countries of residence, 
‘serv[ing] the country from afar’ while remaining closely tied to Greece (Venturas, 2009: 
133). On a geo-economic level, Greece anticipated the growing significance of the Black 
Sea region, primarily as a passage for oil and natural gas pipelines. This was going to lead 
to  a  widening  of  political  relations  between  states  in  this  area  and  the  EU.  Greece 
foresaw itself as a possible intermediary, central to furthering the European integration 
process in these areas and/or playing a role in EU energy policy (ibid.: 130, 132). The 
Greeks  settled  in  the  Black  Sea  region  were  envisaged,  and  indeed  acted  as,  initial 
contacts and orientation aid for Greek businesses wanting to extend into these areas 
(Lesser, 2005). During an interview I conducted at the headquarters of the World Council 
of Hellenes Abroad (SAE) in Thessalonica in 2006 it was evident that the focus was on 
assistance programmes (such as medical aid provision) for Greeks remaining in the Soviet 
Union while there were no provisions for, or information about, Greeks from the FSU 
already in Greece.
47 
Domestic considerations, however, probably had a greater influence on changing 
the policy approach. Not long after their arrival, public perceptions of the ethnic Greeks 
from  the  Soviet  Union  turned  negative.  Like  in  G ermany,  people  lacked  sufficient 
knowledge about their ethnic and historical background (Hess, 2008: 1532) and readily 
associated them with Russians immigrants. Such rejection was hurtfully experienced by 
repatriates in both countries alike. Consider these statements: 
“I  recognised  that  of  course  we  would  be  different  from  the  local  [German] 
population in terms of mentality and other features. But I did not think they would 
see us simply as Russians, a foreign, immigrant population.”
48  
“We are Greeks, true Greeks, like the rest here. We identified as Greeks in the former 
Soviet Union, that was the identity we kept and nurtured. And now, we are some 
sort of half-Greeks or no Greeks at all?”
49 
                                                             
47 Author’s interview, Thessalonica, 28 June 2006. 
48 Savoskul, 2006: 243. 
49 Author’s interview, Kallithea, 9 June 2008. One of Sheffer’s (1991:83) characteristics of a ‘diaspora’ is that 
its members believe they can never fully be accepted by their host society. Interestingly, these interview 
excerpts show that what occurs with post-Soviet Greeks and Germans is an inverted (repeated?) 
phenomenon upon return. After decades and in some cases centuries abroad, they have understood that 
they are not considered equal in the homeland (see also: Hess, 2004). A further investigation of how and 
why Soviet Greeks and Germans maintain diasporic practises would be interesting but goes beyond the 
scope of this paper.     Heß / Ethnic visions of the national self 
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In Greece, the identification of ethnic Greeks as ‘Russians’ was magnified over the 
decade of the 1990, as more and more Russian and Slav-speaking foreign immigrants 
entered the country, many of them illegally.
50. To some extent this is understandable. 
Menidi, a stigmatised, working-class suburb of Athens, gathers many immigrants, old and 
new. How is a native Greek able to distinguish the ethnic Pontian Greek family, consisting 
of ‘verified’ Greek citizens who had striven to preserve their Greek identity in Georgia 
against  pressures  of  assimilation,  from  their  Georgian  friend  and  now  next-door 
neighbour, the woman from Tbilisi? She was trafficked to Greece illegally through Turkey 
because  she  had  no  money  left  to  pay  the  mortgage  for  her  house  and  now  cleans 
houses  in  the  wealthy  Athenian  district  of  Ekali,  not  far  from  Menidi.
51  Among 
themselves, they all speak Russian. Another incidence when doing fieldwork in Athens 
brought this point home to me: Russian was the lingua franca when wanting to converse 
with a variety of different migrant groups (ethnic and non-ethnic) in an aim to survey the 
immigration situation in the country’s capital.  
However,  it  is  not  merely  migrants’  tangible  Russian-ness  that  lead  to  a 
deterioration in perceptions about them. Increasingly, they were identified as ‘working-
class’  immigrants.  Natalia,  an  ethnic  Greek  woman  from  Georgia,  resident  in 
Thessalonica, sums this up poignantly:  
“The locals here, at the beginning they were interested in us.” (…) “For example 
they asked me where I came from, and what I was doing here.” (…) “When we 
started trading on the streets, they became suspicious (…) and now none of them 
cares  anymore  who  we  are  and  where  we  come  from.  ‘Rossopontioi’  [Russian 
Pontians] they call us, while we are really ‘Ellinorossoi’ [Greek Russians].”
52  
Being  either  concentrated  in  neighbourhoods  of  low  social  prestige  or  living  in 
segregated  communities
53  nurtured this image.
54  However,  the  option to  trade  one’s 
goods on open-air markets (laikes agores) was not always a free choice. Initially, Greek 
immigrants from the FSU were not allowed to important large sums of cash but could 
bring  with  them  small  household  utensils,  such  as  pots,  pans,  bed  linen,  towels  etc. 
Having  understood  from  earlier  migrants  that  those  goods  could  be  sold  on  weekly 
markets,  many  families  stocked  them  in  large  quantities  before  coming  to  Greece. 
Earning a livelihood in this way was crucial to many, as the Greek state did not offer social 
welfare provisions as comprehensively as the German state,  especially not in the big 
                                                             
50 It did not help that repatriates continued their use of Russian as a vernacular in public places which 
irritated many local Greeks (Kaurinkoski, 2010b: 3) 
51 Fieldwork in the Athenian municipalities of Menidi (Archanon) and Ekali in June 2008 and 2009. 
52 Author’s interview, Kalamaria, Thessalonica, 4 April 2007. The word ‘Rossopontioi’ is insulting to many 
repatriates from the FSU because it implies that above all they are Russians, of Pontian origin, rather than 
Pontian Greeks who lived in Russia (more correctly the Soviet Union).  
53 Examples in and around Western Thessalonica include settlements in Nikopoli, Euxinoupoli and Galini. 
54 This is a regrettable as many of them have good qualifications (which are often not recognised and/or un-
useable on the Greek and German labour markets). See also: Kassimati, 1992; Vergeti, 2003; Laurentiadou, 
2006, Hess, 2008. Journal of Comparative Research in Anthropology and Sociology, Volume 2, Number 1, Spring 2011 
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cities where most repatriates wanted to live. However, earning a livelihood by trading 
had a price. As one woman poignantly said:  
“And in the minds of the locals, a thought took hold forever: ‘The Pontians are all 
traders’”.
55 
The rejection of post-Soviet repatriates as fellow citizens had two repercussions for 
the ethno-cultural definition of Greekness. On the one hand, it undermined it. Given that 
Greek national identity is preoccupied with the notion of ethnic homogeneity, the co-
ethnic immigrants from the FSU who claimed a rightful membership in the nation and 
were yet so visibly different threatened the very idea of this homogeneity, perhaps more 
so  than  foreign  immigrants  (Tsoukala,  1999:  111).  On  the  other  hand,  their persistent 
rejection  by  the  public  was  a  way  to  uphold  (though  perhaps  not  indefinitely)  the 
ethnically pure vision of the Greek nation with the ‘native born mainland Greek’ as the 
ideal reference point. 
By the mid-1990s, it became apparent that ethnic Greek repatriation had a problem 
with illegality, to a much greater extent than Germany had ever experienced. A number 
of ethnic Greeks had arrived on tourist visas ‘to come and see what Greece was like and 
decide then whether to stay or not’. One such example is my informant Larissa who 
arrived in Thessalonica in 1992 from a small town in Georgia for a ‘trial’ summer vacation 
and then decided to settle in Greece’s second largest city.
56 
57Like Larissa, some co-ethnic 
immigrants overstayed on their tourist visas and became de -factor illegal immigrants, 
despite their entitlement to Greek cit izenship. Moreover, owing to the corruption of 
authorities in the FSU, non-Greek residents had bought ‘ethnicity papers’ and immigrated 
as ethnic Greeks. One such case was published by a Greek newspaper, fuelling the public 
perception that repatriates had come to make undeserved claims on the Greek state (Ta 
Nea, 27 August 1999). Very similarly to Germany, this resulted in social envy and tension-
fraught relations between native mainland Greeks and ‘the other natives’ (Hess, 2008: 
1519). A rise in criminal incidents involving Greeks from the FSU worsened already tense 
relations. This needs to be seen against the sharply risen and now ubiquitous presence of 
migrants in the country, which Greeks feel to be threatening: in early 2010 59% thought 
migration  is  harming  Greece  (Public  Issue,  1338).  Incidences  of  fraud  and  non-Greeks 
taking advantage of Greek citizenship damaged the idea of an ‘ideologically pure’ home-
coming from the FSU and weakened the potential of the repatriates to function as a 
national symbol. 
                                                             
55 Pontians is used here to refer to the Greeks from the FSU who ‘repatriated’ and were in the main Pontian 
Greeks. The way she uses the word ‘traders’ implies a working-class image. Quote taken from: ‘Maska – 
Istorii emigrantov v Gretsii’, 2006. 
56 Author’s interview, Kalamaria, Thessalonica, 11 June 2009. 
57 This very different from Germany where hardly any cases are known to me at present of immigrants who 
arrived on tourist visas for vacations. Over half of the total repatriate population in Greece arrived from 
Georgia, the relative proximity of these countries should partly account for this difference. Other factors 
include different document verification processes and in extension administrative traditions in Greece and 
Germany.     Heß / Ethnic visions of the national self 
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Like  in  Germany,  legislation  towards  repatriates  from  the  FSU  became  less 
generous, especially vis-à-vis citizenship acquisition. I suggest that in Greece this was 
mainly  connected  to  the  bribery  and  document  falsification,  the  general  context  of 
changes  in  diaspora  policy  and  tense  relations  with  local  Greeks,  rather  than  direct 
concerns over numbers. A memorandum by the General Secretary of the Secretariat of 
Repatriating  Greeks
58,  Christos  Kamenidis,  indicates  that  the  functional  aspects  of 
repatriates’ settlement policy continued throughout the mid-1990s: repatriates were still 
to be settled in the poorer regions of Northern Greece in order to ‘revitalise’ these areas 
(Kamenidis, 1996). Also, in view of jealous reactions by local Greeks, repatriates were 
expected to pay part of the costs (Kaurinkoski, 2010b: 7). However, I also found evidence 
to suggest that, at least from an official perspective, by the mid-1990s, there was no less 
ethno-cultural rhetoric vis-à-vis FSU repatriates, at least not in official statements of the 
main governmental body responsible for their settlement. Soviet Greeks were still seen 
as  co-ethnic  brethren  in  need  of  special  assistance.  During  an  interview  with  Mr 
Kamenidis,  ten  years  after  this  memorandum,  he  confirmed  that  the  post-Soviet 
repatriates were to this day the ‘new refugees’ of Greece, because of the suffering they 
had endured and the uprooting that had marked their history. In speaking about the 
rationale for the policies his office devised, he asserted that this experience undoubtedly 
entitled them to the support of the Greek state – and to a better integration effort than 
the EIYAPOE had mustered.
59 
However, concerns over paper falsifications lead, perhaps needed to lead, to a 
gradual distancing from an embracing rhetoric and had a direct impact on legislation and 
citizenship acquisition. Law 2790/2000 transferred the final decision about the Greek 
origin of applicants  to  Greece  (whereas  Germany  transferred  the  initial  selection  and 
verification process to the Former Soviet Union). Special committees were introduced, in 
the country of origin and destination, which verify the Greek ethnicity of the applicant 
during  interviews,  in  addition  to  assessing  supporting  documents  (article  2-4).  Law 
2910/2001, passed one year later, changes important sections of this law and upgrades 
others. Whereas the previous law spoke of the ‘ethnic Greek origin’ of the applicant (η 
ελληνική καταγωγή του ενδιαφερόμενου), the new law changed this to his/her ‘capacity 
to be an ethnic Greek’ (η ιδιότητα του ενδιαφερόμενου ω˂ ομογενού˂). This reflects an 
age-old idea in the Greek citizenship tradition, the idea about the ‘quality of being Greek’ 
and reactivates the controversial, though not uncommon, ideological assumption that 
the  Greek  from  mainland  Greece  is  the  ideal-type  Greek  and  reference  point  of  all 
emigrant  Greeks  (Damanakis,  1999:  6).  Greek  legislators  moved  from  requiring 
documentation to insisting on ‘evidence’ (article 76, paragraph 3; cf. also Voutira, 2004). 
This  evidence  measures,  up  until  today,  the  Greek  national  consciousness  of  the 
applicant, a possession of which is a direct key, though not a guarantee, for obtaining 
Greek citizenship as a co-ethnic immigrant from the FSU.  Committees have the final 
authority to decide which criteria they use for their assessment.  
                                                             
58 This body, part of the Ministry of Macedonia and Thrace and located in Thessalonica, started operating in 
late 1994 and is the second state actor, after the EIYAPOE, to take on repatriate settlement in Greece. 
59 Author’s interview, Aristotle University of Thessalonica, Department of Agriculture, 15 July 2006. Journal of Comparative Research in Anthropology and Sociology, Volume 2, Number 1, Spring 2011 
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The degree of arbitrariness has become a tool to willingly restrict the number of 
naturalisations for Soviet Greek immigrants. Despite the widespread assumption often 
made  in  academic  and  public  discussions  that  obtaining  citizenship  for  post-Soviet 
repatriates is fairly easy, numerous interviews with migrants in Greece have produced an 
alternative view. The right to citizenship, especially for later arrivals after the mid-1990s, 
when the state actively tried to contain the immigration and naturalisation of the Soviet 
‘home-comers’, is by no means a guarantee anymore. One couple recounted that the 
wife was accepted as a Greek citizen, whereas her husband, also of Greek origin, was 
denied naturalisation despite the fact that they had lived and immigrated together. The 
family reflected that very likely his paperwork was deemed ‘insufficient’, but no official 
reason was stated about the refusal of citizenship.
60 In many cases, migrants tell of long 
and tiresome fights with the bureaucracy.  
Greece, like Germany, has found ways to restrict the number of naturalisations it 
grants to its co-ethnic returnees from the FSU. Notwithstanding, compared to other co -
ethnic and non-ethnic migrants, both groups are still the most privileged immigrant 
groups in both countries. 
 
Table 5. Number of naturalisations in three most densely populated prefectures, before and after 1994. 
Region  Naturalisations 1989 - 1994  Naturalisations 1995 – 1999 
Attica  23.278    9.311 
Central Macedonia  21.122  17.807 
East Macedonia and Thrace  12.661  13.582* 
Source: own calculations based on data by Christopoulos, 2009: 120. 
* The high number of naturalisations in East Macedonia and Thrace in the late 1990s, compared to the early 
1990s, can be explained by the continuing interest of the Greek state to settle repatriates from the FSU in 
these areas. In the other two most densely populated regions Attica and Central Macedonia, which include 
the two largest Greek cities respectively, the number of naturalisations notably decreased in the second 
half of the 1990s. 
 
There is evidence to suggest that in the new millennium ethno-cultural references 
linger on officially, for example in legal texts and the assumptions they are based on, and 
occasionally  have  impact  on  sporadic  practical  measures  singling  out  post-Soviet 
repatriates over other migrant groups (see example below). However, there is a gap 
between such privileging on paper and the reality in which repatriates from the FSU are 
less  topical  today  and  are  often  addressed,  if  at  all,  together  with  other  vulnerable 
groups in Greek society. For example, in 2003, the Social Democratic party established so-
called ‘KEP’ centres (citizens advice bureaux) to which members of ‘sensitive categories’ 
such as farmers, women, repatriates and Roma can turn for help (Kathimerini, 31 October 
2003).  Repatriates were referred to as ‘professionally unstable and socially vulnerable 
groups”  (ibid.).  Although  officially  they  are  still  addressed  in  ‘privileged  terms’, 
practically,  they  have  become  ‘social  subjects’,  just  as  in  Germany.  When    they  are 
addressed, their integration problems stand in the foreground. As a consequence, they 
have become more like ‘ordinary’ (foreign) migrants. Let us look at some data.  
                                                             
60 Author’s interview with Pontian Greek family, Thessalonica (Kalamaria), 2 July 2009.     Heß / Ethnic visions of the national self 
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The  last  targeted  housing  programme  for  repatriates  finished  in  2005.
61  A 
statement by a senior official of the Ministry of the Interior in 2009 who wishes to stay 
anonymous is indicative of the official approach towards repatriates in present -day 
Greece:  
“The ‘homogeneis’ (repatriates) are today like any other migrant group in Greece 
who has problems: they can not find work easily, at least not well-paid jobs, they 
have usually little money to live on, and some of them still face housing problems.”
62 
They  or  any  issue  pertaining  to  their  national  significance  or  their  integration 
problems have not been major topics during recent election campaigns. A survey of the 
daily  headlines  of  the  main  Greek  newspapers  over  the  last  three  years  reveals  that 
specific news coverage on Greeks from the FSU has greatly diminished. Before that, if 
repatriate-related issues surfaced, it was primarily to highlight their integration problems 
or issues of non-acceptance (Ta Nea, 4 October 2003), just as in Germany. On May 13
th 
2010, the Deputy Minister of the Interior preliminarily agreed to pay out monies promised 
during  the  previous  2004  rent  subsidy  programme  (some  of  which  was  not  actually 
rewarded) and perhaps extend this form of housing support indefinitely (Eleftherotypia, 
13 May 2010). At the meeting it was also envisaged to appoint specific experts to tackle 
the remaining integration problems faced by repatriates. Primarily, bureaucratic hurdles 
in obtaining citizenship were emphasised, which acknowledges the difficulties of many of 
my informants. This could be seen as an indicator that repatriates’ integration problems 
might gain relevance under the new social-democratic government. Developments are 
impossible to judge at this point in time. However, it seems more likely that this is a final 
step  to  solve  problems  caused  by  long-standing  structural  problems  of  the  Greek 
administration. It seems that overall, in 2011, the ‘co-ethnic home-comers’ have lost their 
relevance in society, at least as a privileged group of fellow blood brothers to whom the 
state feels or propagates a specific obligation (regardless of the rationale that historically 
underpinned such a rhetoric of solidarity).  
A year ago, in March 2010, it was the newly elected social democratic government 
of PASOK which overhauled Greece’s citizenship regulations towards a more democratic 
and  inclusive  version  incorporating  new  elements  of  double  jus  soli  (Law  3838).  In 
Germany, ten years earlier, these reforms had also been initiated by a social democratic 
government. According to those in charge, 
“… [immigrants] are an integral part of the Greek society. It’s a reality and we can 
not  ignore  it.  Naturalisation  of  foreigners  to  this  extent  comes  as  a  natural 
consequence  of  an  integration  process  which  takes  under  consideration  this 
reality.”
63  
                                                             
61 According to an interview with Deputy Minister of the Interior, Mrs Theodora Tzagri, 3 May 2010. 14 days 
after the interview, however, a Greek newspaper reported that it was agreed to extend this programme, 
perhaps indefinitely (Eleftherotypia, 13 May 2010). 
62 Author’s interview, Department for Social Integration, Ministry of the Interior, Athens, 26 June 2009. 
63 Author’s interview with Deputy Minister of the Interior, Mrs Theodora Tzagri, 3 May 2010.  Journal of Comparative Research in Anthropology and Sociology, Volume 2, Number 1, Spring 2011 
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As in Germany, the naturalisation of foreigners becomes easier (reduction from ten 
to  seven  years  of  lawful  residence  and  the  introduction  of  a  transitional  five  years 
residence requirement). The law allows second-generation legal immigrants to vote in 
local elections. Children born to foreign parents in Greece who have spent six years in 
Greek schools can also apply for Greek citizenship. Moreover, deadlines are introduced 
for administrative decisions. With all that, however, the official notion of the privileged 
co-ethnic on grounds of his ‘inherent’ Greekness is further upheld, alluding to his Greek 
identity in terms reminiscent of Geertz’ primordialism. During our interview, the Deputy 
Minister of the Interior comments:   
“It  is  a  reasonable  distinction  between  ‘homogeneis’  and  ‘allogeneis’  which  is 
included in the provisions of the new legislation since the knowledge of the Greek 
language, history and civilisation is a necessary prerequisite for someone applying for 
citizenship. As a prerequisite the knowledge of the Greek language in the case of the 
‘homogenon’ [person with co-ethnic descent] has already been fulfilled because their 
Greek descent that helps them develop what we call a ‘Greek consciousness’.”
64 
As discussed above, despite these legal provisions perpetuating the privileging of 
the co-ethnic over the foreigner, they do not reverberate into tangible provisions, except 
for a few practical measures (for example the rent subsidy programme and a much lower 
naturalisation fee for repatriates than for foreigners). This gap is compounded by the 
fact that repatriates from the FSU are still not accepted by their fellow countrymen as 
the co-ethnics they are on paper.  
Overall, the gap between rhetoric and practice in relation to repatriates is curiously 
symptomatic of a wider tendency. A close reading of the new law and its implementation 
guidelines and an interview about its rationale with the Deputy Minister of the Interior 
has lead me to the assumption that for all its progressiveness and the break it constitutes 
with Greece’s long standing tradition of jus sanguinis, there is one aspect in which the 
new legislation does not differ: it remains faithful to the idea of Greece as a cultural 
nation. Although the new citizenship law eases legal provisions for the naturalisation of 
foreigners  and  breaks  away  from  purely  descent-based  criteria,  the  ‘pass  criteria’  for 
Greek  citizenship  are  still  vaguely  defined  and  emphasise  as  prerequisites  cultural 
consciousness  and  an  awareness  of  the  genesis  and  evolution  of  the  Greek  nation. 
According to the Ministry of the Interior, the reasoning behind it is as follows: 
“This knowledge … (about  major events in the history of the country that shaped up 
its course in time and formed what we call the ‘Hellenic consciousness’) … will be a 
major asset for the immigrant himself since it will help him understand better the 
social environment in which he chose to live [which] will also prove valuable for the 
host society since its coherence will be further enhanced.”
65 
Recent  developments  emphasise  the  intensity  of  the  debate  this  reform  has 
fuelled. A department of the Greek Council of State (the Supreme Administrative Court 
                                                             
64 Author’s interview with Deputy Minister of the Interior, Mrs Theodora Tzagri, 3 May 2010.  
65 Author’s interview with Deputy Minister of the Interior, Mrs Theodora Tzagri, 3 May 2010.     Heß / Ethnic visions of the national self 
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of  Greece)  has  declared  the  citizenship  law  passed  in  2010  as  unconstitutional.  The 
department deems that it runs counter to the need ‘to preserve the ethnic homogeneity 
of the state, among other things, also via the establishment of a citizenship law, the 
provisions of which are based primarily on the fixed principle of the law of blood, jus 
sanguinis,  i.e.  the  descent  from  Greek  parents’.
66  The  judges  argue  that  only  Greeks 
should be allowed the right to vote in local elections and citizenship should be reserved 
for  individuals  of  Greek  descent.  They  also  question  the  validity  of  criteria  for  the 
acquisition of citizenship, arguing that citizenship has been awarded to individuals who 
were  not  of  sufficient  Greek  consciousness.
67  Officially, their ruling wholly exempts 
repatriates from the former Soviet Union as they are seen to have absorbed Greek 
consciousness on the basis of their bloodline, however far back it reaches. 
On the basis of the material explored in this article, I suggest that in the same way 
in which rhetoric about the privileged co-ethnic immigrant from the FSU on paper differs 
from his situation in reality, there continues to be an attachment to the cultural idea of 
the  nation  (whereas  the  insistence  on  its  ethnic  homogeneity  has  diminished), 
sometimes despite the fact that the immigrant population in Greece is growing and thus, 
calls for a more civic-territorial notion of nationhood are likely to continue. Indeed, the 
continuing  formal  framing  of  repatriates  in  ethno-cultural,  almost  essentialist,  and 
advantageous terms, is a symbol of the enduring power of cultural notions with regard 
to  the  acquisition  of  citizenship  and  national  identity  discourse.  However,  it  seems 
unreasonable to assume that this is an exclusively unidirectional process. It appears most 
likely  that  we  are  witnessing  (and  will  continue  to  witness)  an  increasing  conflict 
between  traditionalist  and  reformist  forces  in  Greece,  between  those  who  insist  on 
Greece’s ethnic homogeneity against the reality of mass immigration and a multicultural 
Greece and those who take the latter as an incentive to begin to rethink some of the 
ethno-national  parameters which have long defined Greek national consciousness. What 
corroborates this point is that Greece, like Germany ten years ago, has created the first 
comprehensive legal framework dealing with the consequences of having become an 
multicultural  immigration  country.  It  is  participating,  hopefully  not  just  on  paper,  in 
attempts  to  facilitate  greater  social  cohesion.
68  Based  on  the  selected  evidence 
examined in this paper, it seems reasonable to assume that mass immigration and the 
permanent settlement of migrants as well a s the diminishing relevance of repatriates 
from the FSU have contributed to this. Although for the moment they seem to have done 
less to challenge a cultural vision of Greek nationhood, debates are now being fought 
which may have seemed unrealistic twenty years ago.  
Conclusion 
Our juxtaposition of the Greek and German approach to repatriation and national identity 
discourse reinforces the assertion that a nexus exists between ethnic ‘returnees’ and an 
                                                             
66 Mandravelis, P., ‘The blood and the law’, Kathimerini, 3 February 2011. 
67 Ibid., cf. also ‘Court questions legality of citizenship law’, Ekathimerini, 2 February 2011. 
68 “[It is] part of our political vision of social cohesion and (...) a contributing factor to social development.” 
Deputy Minister of the Interior, Mrs Theodora Tzagri, 3 May 2010.  Journal of Comparative Research in Anthropology and Sociology, Volume 2, Number 1, Spring 2011 
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ethno-cultural view of the nation. This paper has demonstrated that for ethno-cultural 
nations diasporas and ‘repatriations’ are useful not just as a means of accessing valuable 
clues  about  the  dominant  view  of  nationhood  but  also  as  a  gauge  for  changes  they 
undergo. 
The comparative analysis of the Greek and German case relied on primary data such 
as author’s interviews, press reviews, opinion polls, as well as a comparative review of 
secondary literature, setting the author’s material against previous findings by Greek, 
German  and  international  scholars.  The  analysis  highlighted  the  contingency  and 
malleability of national identity discourse and its reliance and utilisation of key groups or 
symbols deemed indispensable to this discourse. It showcased that for nations with a 
historically strong ethno-cultural self-understanding diasporas and migrations of ethnic 
unmixing are such key variables. Varying combinations of ethno-cultural symbolism and 
functional  political  and  economic  rhetoric  have  informed  Greek  and  German  national 
identity discourses vis-à-vis their ‘repatriates’ from Eastern Europe and specifically the 
former Soviet Union. A series of ostensible similarities in both countries’ official approach 
towards  these  minorities  strengthens  the  claim  that  such  discourse  is  continually 
readjusted  and  shifts  according  to  circumstance.  In  the  wake  of  changing  reference 
points of national identity definition, the usefulness and usability of these key players can 
change concomitantly.  
Policy  makers  in  Greece  and  Germany  (and  co-ethnic  migrants  themselves) 
demonstrate  the  mobilisation  of  ethnicity.  Ethnic  self-ascription  and  ascription  play 
important  roles  in  this  process  of  mobilisation.  Despite  formal  rhetoric,  repatriates’ 
presumed autochthonous identity was rejected by local Greek and Germans, impacting in 
turn on their function and credibility as a national symbol. Our case studies illustrate that 
such  forces,  in  combination  with  pressures  of  non-ethnic  immigration  and  changing 
policy objectives, have the potential to influence national identity discourse, resulting in 
changes to citizenship regulations.  
Developments reviewed in Germany and particularly in Greece are testimonies to 
the  fact  that  the  pressures  of  modernity  and  inclusivity  are  salient  demands  able  to 
transform discourses of nationhood in ethno-cultural nations. These countries’ ethnic 
identity is confronted and interacts with other identities, such as being an EU-member 
state, an important regional player and part of a globalising world affected by large scale 
immigration.  However,  especially  as  our  exploration  of  Greece  demonstrates,  such 
pressures have to be managed against the ethnic and cultural tradition and relationship 
with  repatriates.  They  have  to  be  negotiated  against  old  loyalties  and  entrenched 
convictions,  sometimes  generating  conflicting  currents.  Whereas  the  pressures  to 
‘modernise’  an  ethno-cultural  self-conception  can  present  themselves  quite 
straightforwardly,  even  inevitably,  the  response  is  a  gradual  and  complex  process 
involving a redefinition of deep-rooted mentalities. Greece stands as an example that 
formal measures, such as citizenship reforms, are only the beginning of such a  process 
with a yet undeterminable outcome.  
Finally, this paper raises interesting questions about formal and informal boundary 
making.  They  are  at  the  heart  of  questions  about  belonging  and  membership  in  the     Heß / Ethnic visions of the national self 
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nation.  In  the  process  of  redefining  what  it  means  to  be  Greek  or  German,  old 
distinctions  of we-they,  natives  and  foreigners,  become blurred.  Such  re-negotiations 
often lead to uncertainties and deliberation among the public and elites. Greece shows 
that repatriates are able to add to this complexity as their public rejection resulting from 
their presumed similarity and visible otherness intensifies the debate about belonging 
and access to the nation. The current controversial ‘opening’ of the ethnic principle with 
a concurrent maintenance of the cultural idea in Greece shows that formal and informal 
boundary constructions continue to influence policy making in Athens. At the same time, 
the tensions which these developments generate highlight once more how salient such 
constructions are in debates which re-negotiate national identities. 
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